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1 Our analysis omits some other
aspects of labor contracts that
have been considered in the 
literature.  First, we assume
risk-neutral workers, so wage
payments do not play any
insurance role, in contrast to
implicit contract models.
Second, renegotiation of wage
contracts is allowed, meaning
that inefﬁcient severance can-
not occur as a consequence of
failure to renegotiate.  Implicit
contract models are surveyed 
in Romer (1996, ch.10); see
Boldrin and Horvath (1995)
for a recent empirical imple-
mentation.  Suppression of
renegotation as a cause of dis-
placement is considered in
Hashimoto and Yu (1980) and
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odels of moral hazard in labor rela-
tionships have proven to be useful
in explaining a variety of important
macroeconomic phenomena.  The exis-
tence of involuntary unemployment has
been linked to the need to provide incen-
tives for workers to choose high effort
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Further,
since wage levels are important for work-
ers’ incentives, adjustment of wages in
response to cyclical shocks may be subject
to contractual constraints.  This may help
to explain the low observed variability 
of average wages relative to employment
levels (Danthine and Donaldson, 1990,
1995; Strand, 1992; MacLeod, Malcomson
and Gomme, 1994).  More recently, con-
tracting problems have been tied to 
inefﬁcient severance of employment rela-
tionships, giving a mechanism whereby
business cycle shocks may be magniﬁed
and made more persistent (Ramey and
Watson, 1997a).
This paper focuses on the contract-
theoretic underpinnings of wage
adjustment and worker displacement in
moral-hazard models of the labor market.
We show that contracting imperfections
play a key role in determining the fragility
of employment relationships in the face of
shocks to productivity, as well as
inﬂuencing the form of worker compensa-
tion.  Moreover, the responses of aggregate
wages and employment to business-cycle
shocks are sensitive to the structure of
worker/ﬁrm contracting.  Overall, our
study establishes that the particular form
of contracting imperfections can have
major implications for economic outcomes.
This highlights the importance of going
beyond the reduced-form analysis of con-
tracting that typiﬁes much of the
macroeconomics literature.
Our key assumption throughout is 
that ﬁrms and workers maintain long-term
contractual relationships, whereby a particular
firm and worker transact repeatedly until
their relationship is severed.  Within a uni-
ﬁed theoretical framework, we consider two
types of contracting imperfections in labor
relationships.  First, relationships may be
subject to limited veriﬁability, whereby
external enforcement authorities are unable
to compel payments conditioned on the full
set of actions chosen by the contracting
partners.  For example, the authorities may
be unable to ascertain whether severance of
the relationship was due to the worker’s
action or the ﬁrm’s action.  Second, desirable
contracts may be infeasible due to the work-
er’s limited liquidity, which prevents the
worker from making payments to the ﬁrm.1
We demonstrate that privately
inefﬁcient breakup of relationships may
occur in the presence of limited veriﬁability;
that is, limited veriﬁability leads contracts
to be fragile.  The fundamental idea is that
when a negative shock hits, the joint
returns to cooperation between the ﬁrm
and worker may be insufﬁcient to offset
the collective inducements to behave dis-
honestly, so there is no way to specify
transfers between the ﬁrm and worker that
can preserve the relationship.  Increased
veriﬁability leads to more robust relation-
ships, more direct punishments for
misbehavior, and a wider set of optimal
compensation schemes.  The worker’s 
relative bargaining position always
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2 Our recent analysis of lending
relationships and liquidity ﬂows
(den Haan, Ramey, and Watson,
1999a) incorporates a con-
tracting framework that is a
special case of the one consid-
ered here. More tangentially
related is den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (1999b), which
explores the theoretical founda-
tion of stylized facts about com-
pensation over a worker’s
career and the experiences of
displaced workers.
3 For example, one component
of our theory is the view that
discretionary transfers are sub-
ject to renegotiation.
determines his total compensation, while
the particular forms of payment may be
inﬂuenced by the requirements of contracting.
Performance bonding, for example, arises
naturally in settings of unrestricted
liquidity, but may be circumscribed when
the worker is liquidity constrained.  More-
over, since the form of compensation is
identiﬁed by the timing and conditioning of
payments, informal notions such as salary
may be ambiguous.
Our framework also allows for a more
precise analysis of the role of wage premia
in solving labor contracting problems.  We
say that a worker obtains an efﬁciency wage
when, in contract negotiation, the ﬁrm and
worker must directly weigh reducing the
worker’s compensation against motivating
effort.  We demonstrate that, in the absence
of liquidity constraints, effort incentives 
are driven by veriﬁability, bargaining power,
and the state of the matching market, but
not by the worker’s current period compen-
sation.  Thus, in a precise sense, efﬁciency
wages play no role in helping to preserve
relationships.  When the worker is liquid-
ity constrained, however, the incentive
constraint may bind at the time of contract
negotiation, as a consequence of the work-
er’s inability to make payments to the ﬁrm
that would implement the unconstrained
bargaining outcome.  Thus, efﬁciency wages
may emerge as added restrictions on wage
determination when workers are liquidity
constrained.
To analyze how contracting imperfec-
tions affect market outcomes, we posit 
that relationships are formed on a
matching market, as in Pissarides (1985)
and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).  
We consider an example in which a limited
liquidity speciﬁcation with efﬁciency
wages but no fragility is contrasted with 
a limited veriﬁability speciﬁcation that 
is subject to fragility.  In response to a 
permanent shock to the distribution 
of productivity, the presence of limited 
liquidity does serve to dampen wage
adjustment, relative to a complete-
contracting benchmark.  However, the
dampening is much more pronounced 
in the limited veriﬁability case, as the 
severance of low-productivity relationships
greatly reduces the sensitivity of average
wages to the shock.  Moreover, the effect
of the shock on total employment is greatly
magniﬁed as a consequence of fragility.
Our example illustrates how models that
emphasize displacement may be much
more potent for explaining wage adjustment
and propagation of shocks than models
stressing wage effects within a given
employment contract.
The framework presented in this paper
builds on the contracting model of Ramey
and Watson (1997a), who ﬁrst developed
the theoretical foundation of fragility and
the related magniﬁcation of shocks.  The
present paper is also related to our earlier
work on endogenous destruction margins
and propagation of shocks, as reported 
in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1997).
Here we address a wider range of contractual
imperfections (including liquidity constraints
and a range of veriﬁability conditions), we
incorporate wage determination, and we
consider adjustment of average wages in
market equilibrium.2 Our framework is
also related to the work of MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989, 1993, 1998).  MacLeod
and Malcomson focus on the timing and
enforcement of compensation, using a
model in which parties can make both
externally enforced and discretionary
transfers.  Two contractual forms are
emphasized: efﬁciency wages (which they
deﬁne as the use of high wages with the
threat of severance) and performance pay
(deﬁned by the use of discretionary
bonuses).  They demonstrate how the
form of compensation depends on labor
market conditions and equilibrium beliefs,
interpreting the latter as a “social norm 
for a fair wage.”  Our work, in contrast,
addresses (a) a broader range of
contracting settings, including different
restrictions pertaining to veriﬁability and
liquidity; (b) inefﬁcient severance of rela-
tionships following shocks; and (c) issues
of propagation in the macroeconomy.  We
also take a different approach to modeling
contract determination, whereby negotia-
tion (and renegotiation) between workers
and ﬁrms is directly incorporated.3MAY/JUNE  1999
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
57
4 The model is easily extended 
to introduce imperfect monitor-
ing of effort choices, as follows.
In phase 2, outcome A  is
reached with a positive proba-
bility under either effort choice
of the manager, with low effort
implying a greater probability
of reaching A.  Similarly, in
phase 3 the probability of 
outcome B  is higher when the
worker chooses low effort.
Thus, the contract cannot be
conditioned directly on the
effort choices, but only on the 
observable outcomes.
On the issue of contractual form, we
obtain results different from those of
MacLeod and Malcomson.  
The main body of this paper is divided
into four sections.  The ﬁrst introduces the
basic model of an employment relationship.
The second considers enforcement under
various contracting environments, which
differ in terms of what can be veriﬁed to a
third party.  The third section discusses
efﬁciency wages and limited liquidity, while




Employment relationships consist of
one worker and one ﬁrm who interact in
periods t  = 1, 2, ... until their relationship
is severed.  The ﬁrm is represented by a
manager.  Both the worker and manager
make a private effort choice (high or low)
that contributes to production.  In addition,
the parties negotiate a contract specifying
transfers as a function of veriﬁable informa-
tion.  If both agents exert high effort during
production, then the cooperative output
level z t is realized.  We assume  that zt
varies randomly across periods, taking the
value zG in the good production state and
zB in the bad state, with zG >  zB > 0.  For 
simplicity, zt is assumed to be realized
independently in each period, with r
denoting the probability that zt =  zB.
The realization of z t , contracting, 
and effort choices within a period occur 
in three  phases, as illustrated in Figure 1.
In phase 1, the worker and manager
observe the realized value of zt for that
period, then negotiate a contract that 
governs current-period interaction.  If they
reach an agreement, the contract speciﬁes
which decisions the agents will make in
subsequent phases, as well as a proﬁle of
contingent payments.  Disagreement leads
to severance of the relationship, with the
worker and manager obtaining outside
option values of bw +  ww and bm +  wm,
respectively.  The parameters b  j reﬂect 
current-period beneﬁts received when 
the relationship is severed in phase 1 
(e.g., the worker may obtain unemployment
beneﬁts), while the parameters wj indicate
the discounted values of future beneﬁts,
which may include returns from new rela-
tionships formed in the future.  Severance
as a result of disagreement will be referred
to as outcome D.  Further details of the
contract negotiation are discussed below.
The manager makes his effort choice
in phase 2.  Low effort leads to outcome A,
where the manager obtains a current-period
private beneﬁt of xm, while the worker
receives no beneﬁt.  Worker effort is selected
in phase 3; there, low effort leads to
outcome B, in which the worker receives 
a current-period private beneﬁt of xw and
the manager obtains zero.  Under either
low-effort outcome, output is zero and 
the relationship is severed at the end of 
the period.  On the other hand, high effort
by both agents induces the cooperative
outcome C, in which case output is zt and
the relationship continues into the next
period.  The manager is assumed to appro-
priate the output.4
We assume xj > bj for both j, meaning
that agents gain more in the current period
from staying in the relationship and putting
out low effor t, than from leaving the 
Figure 1
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relationship in phase 1.  Observe, however,
that when an agent chooses low effort, 
his partner forgoes the opportunity to
obtain bj.  We also assume that x j < bw+bm,
meaning the agents will never agree in
phase 1 to induce outcomes A or B.  
Interpretations for our assumptions 
are discussed below.
We now compute the value of the 
relationship under various outcomes.
First, the agents may choose high effort
under both zG and zB in every period, in
which case the relationship never breaks
up.  In this robust solution, the value of the
relationship is given by
where b is the agents’ common discount
factor.  We let gR denote the discounted
continuation value of the relationship in
this case:
Second, the agents may agree to select
high effort when zG is realized, but to
sever the relationship under zB.  In this
fragile solution, in each period the
relationship breaks up with probability r.
The discounted future value of the
relationship in this case satisﬁes
where b=bw+bm and w=ww+wm.  Solving
for gF yields
Finally, the agents may agree to sever the
relationship under both zG and zB and the
relationship breaks up in period 1, having
value b+w.
We impose a ﬁnal assumption:
(1)
where x = xw+xm.  The ﬁrst inequality in
assumption 1 implies that the agents prefer
the robust outcome under either production
state, so that the robust outcome is efﬁcient.
The remaining two inequalities will deter-
mine the conditions under which the
agents can ﬁnd a contract that supports
the robust and fragile solutions, as
discussed below.
Contracting
At the start of each period, the worker
and manager negotiate a short-term contract
that speciﬁes payments from the manager
to the worker conditional on the
productivity level zk, k=G, B, and on the
outcome of productive interaction (A, B, or
C).  The set of feasible contracts is gener-
ally constrained by the limits of the external
enforcement institution.  Payments might
also be subject to liquidity constraints.  
Let sk
C denote the payment made to the
worker in the event that outcome C is real-
ized, under productivity level zk, k = G, B.
Since the manager directly appropriates zk
when outcome C is reached, his current-
period payoff in this case is zk – sk
C, while
the worker obtains sk
C.  Transfers conditioned
on outcomes A and B will be written sA
and sB, respectively; these transfers will 
not need to depend on k.  In addition, the
agents may agree on up-front transfers sk
0,
made at the time of contracting in phase 1.
We adopt the convention that negative
values of sk
C, sA, sB and sk
0 denote transfers
from the worker to the manager.
The worker and manager also formu-
late a joint plan for how they will behave
in the future, which yields an expected
continuation value g.  For example, if 
the agents intend to implement a robust
solution, then g=gR.  We look for a speciﬁ-
cation of behavior, consisting of explicit
contracts and individual actions over time,
that satisﬁes four conditions.  First, agents’
expectations about g accurately reﬂect 
the value of continuing the relationship.
Second, in each period, agents make their
effort choices in a utility-maximizing manner,
given g and the values of transfers agreed 
to under the contract.  Third, short-term
b w z g x w z g
B R G F + < + < + < + ,
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contract negotiation is resolved according 
to the Nash bargaining solution.  Here, the
agents recognize that they are implicitly 
bargaining over the total value of the
relationship, which is the sum of current-
period returns and the continuation value g
(assuming the agents are able to maintain
the relationship into the next period).  
The worker’s and manager’s bargaining
weights are pw and p m, respectively, and 
the disagreement point is outcome D.  
The parameters pw and pmare nonnegative
and satisfy pw+pm= 1.  Fourth, the best
equilibrium satisfying the ﬁrst three 
conditions is selected by the ﬁrm and
worker.5 In light of assumption 1, the 
ﬁrm and worker will chose the robust
solution if it can be supported.  Next 
in line is the fragile solution, followed 
by immediate severance.
Interpretation
Effort choices and unemployment beneﬁts.
Our model of employment relationships
allows for effort choices by both workers
and managerial personnel.  These choices
can be interpreted in a number of ways.
The most familiar interpretation involves
personal exertion, and here we augment
the usual shirking model by specifying
that, in addition to worker effort, manage-
rial effort is also important for production.
Further, low effort may entail activities
that are directly harmful to production,
such as theft.  Managers may also abuse
their power to direct workers’ activities, 
by unexpectedly assigning them to
undesirable tasks.
An agent obtains a current-period 
private beneﬁt when he chooses low effort.
Alternatively, the agents can agree to dissolve
their relationship at the start of the period
and obtain current-period beneﬁts outside
the relationship.  A key assumption of our
model is that these unemployment beneﬁts
become unavailable once agents have agreed
to a contract and have proceeded to phase
2; that is, the agents must make a commit-
ment to production activities that rule out
outside beneﬁts in the current period.  We
have also assumed that low effort conveys
a larger private beneﬁt than does unem-
ployment (this is the assumption x j > b j, 
j = w, m).  The most direct way to interpret
this assumption is that employment
relationships convey perks that are them-
selves attractive, apart from personal costs
associated with high effort.  Further,
unemployment may involve private costs,
such as psychic harm and search costs,
that are not incurred within active relation-
ships.  Note that private beneﬁts are zero
for agents who exert high effort in a relation-
ship, which serves to normalize utility.6
Low effort and severance. We have
assumed that low effort by either the
worker or manager leads the employment
relationship to be severed.  There are two
basic motivations for this assumption.
First, low effort may induce rapid decay 
in the productivity of the relationship, to
the point where returns to continuation
fall short of operating costs.  For the man-
ager, low effort might also be directly tied
to liquidation; for example, the manager
may sell off essential assets.  Second, con-
tractual enforcement mechanisms used by
the partners to sustain cooperation may
entail a costly and time-consuming dispute
resolution process in the event that either
agent chooses low effort; see Ramey and
Watson (1997b) for a detailed discussion
of such mechanisms.  When dispute reso-
lution costs are sufﬁciently high, the
worker and manager will opt to sever 
their relationship.
As another possibility for contractual
agreement, the agents might seek to
temporarily suspend their relationship
when high effort is unsustainable, for
example, through a layoff, in order to 
preserve match capital.  Such suspensions
will be infeasible, however, if returns from
the relationship would experience rapid
deterioration without active inputs of
effort.  For example, production equipment
or organization may depreciate during the
suspension, or market dominance may be
permanently lost.  Further, as will become
clearer below, contracts that support
temporary suspension will be infeasible 
if a third-party enforcement authority 
5 The ﬁrst three properties 
deﬁne a negotiation equilibrium,
which is simply a speciﬁcation
of behavior consistent with pri-
vate incentives and the Nash
bargaining solution.  Speciﬁcally,
the Nash solution implies that,
given g, the surplus of the rela-
tionship at the time of negotia-
tion (which is z
k + g – b – w)
is shared in proportions deﬁned
by the bargaining weights.  The
fourth property implies that, at
the meta-level of negotiating
over negotiation equilibria, the
ﬁrm and worker select the equi-
librium that maximizes their
joint returns.  For example, if
they could sustain both the val-
ues gR and gF, then they are
assumed to select the preferred
plan yielding gR.  In our frame-
work, there will always be an
equilibrium that is maximal in
every period.
6 Our setup admits the standard
shirking model, in which ﬁrms
behave more passively.  The
standard model is obtained by
setting b
m= x
m= 0, so that the
manager obtains neither unem-
ployment beneﬁts nor beneﬁts
from low effort.  In this case,
the manager’s incentive to agree
to the contract at phase 1 are
identical to his incentive to
choose high effort at phase 2,
so in effect the manager does
not make an effort choice.is unable to tell whether suspension
resulted from a breach of contract by 
one of the parties.
While severance following low effort 
is our benchmark case, the model can 
also cover situations in which temporary
suspension is feasible.  This is done by 
setting wj = gj – aj, j  =  w, m,  where gw
and gm give the discounted values to the
worker and manager, respectively, of 
continuing the relationship into the next
period, and am and aw are the costs 
of maintaining the relationship while 
not producing.
Contracted transfer payments.  The model
allows for contracts specifying an up-front
transfer to the worker, sk
0, as well as a
transfer that is made conditional on
choices of high effort by both agents, sk
C.
The former can be interpreted as a “salary,”
in that it is paid in return for the worker’s
commitment to forgo his unemployment
beneﬁt and commit to production
activities for some interval of time, while
the latter represents a “performance
payment,” received only after the
successful completion of production.7
The transfers sA and sB are used to impose
direct punishments for low effort and 
can be interpreted as damages stipulated
by the contract for nonper- formance, or
penalties imposed by an external legal or
regulatory authority.
Contract duration.  We have assumed that
agents can write only short-term contracts,
specifying transfers that are enforceable
within the current period.  In this
contracting environment, the transfers sA
and sB can be thought of as severance pay-
ments (in addition to punishments), since
the relationship is dissolved following low
effort.  Note that agents are free to sever
their relationship following outcome C,
but such a decision is made in phase 1 of
the next period, after the current contract
expires.  Thus, by short-term contract  we
mean that the agents cannot stipulate to
transfers conditional on whether they
reach agreement in the negotiation phase 




The agents’ ability to ﬁnd a contract that
supports the robust solution will depend on
whether they are able to enforce the needed
contingent transfer payments.  This, in turn,
depends on what external enforcement
authorities can observe about the current-
period effort choices.  We begin by considering
the case of full veriﬁability, in which the
external authority can perfectly observe
which of the outcomes A, B, or C is realized.
In this case, the robust solution is supported
and, therefore, it is selected by the agents.
This is conﬁrmed by checking the four
conditions of our contracting solution.
Since the outcome must be C in every
period under the robust solution, the
worker’s total compensation is given by 





for periods having the good state and 
bad state, respectively.  Note that we are
assuming the agents select the same contract
in each period.9 Bargaining in each period
determines the discounted value of this
payment stream. This is characterized by
(2)
where gwR indicates the discounted 
future value to the worker of continuing
the relationship:
To interpret equation 2, note that the left
side is the worker’s value of continuing the
relationship under the cooperative plan.
The Nash solution dictates that sk
0 and sk
C
be set so that this value is equal to the
worker’s outside option plus his share of
the surplus of the relationship.  The above
two equalities capture the ﬁrst and third
conditions of equilibrium.  To verify the
second condition, note that outcome C
g
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7 MacLeod and Malcomson’s
(1989, 1993, 1998) bonus
payment is like sk
C, although
they assume it is discretionary;
for example, the ﬁrm is not
contractually committed to
make the payment.  In our
framework, ﬁrms would never
make discretionary transfers
following production, and only
what is enforceable matters.
8 In our setting, short- and long-
term contracts differ only to the
extent that agents can enforce
a transfer conditional on out-
come D occurring in the next
period. To see this, consider
two contracting environments:
(a) short-term, as described in
the text; and (b) long-term,
with a recontracting option in
each period.  Fix the scope of
what can be veriﬁed and
enforced within a given period,
and assume that the agents
have symmetric information
whenever they negotiate.  Then
(a) and (b) support exactly the
same behavior over time, if in
setting (b) the agents cannot
condition transfers on outcome
D occurring in the next period.
Further, the latter restriction on
setting (b) may be implied by
limited liability, in that the legal
institution might not enforce
transfers conditional on sever-
ance unless there is cause for
awarding damages.  In most of
the work presented here,
options for long-term contract-
ing do not affect our results.
9 This is without loss of generali-
ty, given that in each period the
agents maximize their joint
value over feasible equilibria.
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Inequalities 3 and 4 can be satisﬁed for
each k by making sA sufﬁciently positive
and sB sufﬁciently negative, that is, by
imposing sufﬁciently large punishments
for choosing low effort.  Since the robust
solution maximizes the joint value of the
relationship in each period (from phase 1,
where negotiation occurs), the fourth 
contracting condition also holds.
Beyond the requirements on sA and sB,
there is wide latitude for selecting salary
and performance payments that satisfy
equation 2, and there is essentially no 
distinction between the two kinds of 
payment.  For example, contracts might
involve performance payments only, or
salaries only; in the latter case, the worker’s
incentive to choose high effort is supported
by the loss of future-period salary payments,
rather than current- and future-period 
performance payments.
Limited Veriﬁability
Now suppose the enforcement
authority can enforce payments conditional
on severance of the relationship due to low
effort, but the authority cannot ascertain
which agent’s low effort choice caused the
separation.  That is, the authority cannot
distinguish between outcomes A and B.
Remember that the agents cannot contract
on severance following outcome C, since
this would occur in the next period.  How-
ever, the agents can still specify the transfer
sk
C contingent on C occurring.  Further
recall that, at the time of negotiation, there
is no outstanding contract specifying trans-
fers in the event of outcome D.
Given the limitation on what can 
be observed, the contract can specify only
a single severance transfer s, where sA = sB
= s.  Let us check whether the robust 
solution can be supported.  Adding the
incentive conditions 3 and 4 gives
(5)
which fails when k = B, given assumption 1.
Thus, in the bad productivity state, either
the manager or the worker will have an
incentive to choose low effort, no matter
what value of s is proposed.  Limitations
on veriﬁability, in the form of inability to
condition severance transfers on the reason
for severance, imply that the robust solution
becomes infeasible.  The key problem is that
the joint surplus from cooperative behavior,
given by zB + gR, falls short of the sum of
the agents’ returns from low effort, which
are xm + wm and xw + ww.
Despite their inability to achieve the
robust solution, the agents can ﬁnd a con-
tract that supports the fragile solution.  
We can specify sG
0 + sG
C to satisfy 
(6)
where gwF gives the worker’s discounted
future value of continuation in the fragile
solution:
Thus, the ﬁrst and third equilibrium con-
ditions are satisﬁed.  Since zG + gF > x + w,
we can ﬁnd a value sG




and clearly each agent has an incentive to
choose high effort in the good state.  Thus,
the relationship continues as long as the
good state is realized, while in the bad
state the relationship is severed.  Finally,
the fourth equilibrium condition follows
from the fact that zG + gF > b+w; that is,
the fragile solution is superior to immediate
s s g x w C
G wF w w - ( )+ ³ + ,
z s s g g x w
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infeasible. Importantly, severance is inefﬁ-
cient for the agents, since zB + gR > b+w
implies that the agents would prefer the
robust solution if it could be implemented.
Observe further that there is a large range
of payment proﬁles that can support the
fragile solution; for example, if higher sG
C is
speciﬁed, then the severance transfers will
be correspondingly increased to preserve
inequalities 7 and 8, and sG
0 will be reduced
to maintain equation 6.  As in the case of
full veriﬁability, here the worker’s total
compensation, driven by relative bargaining
powers, does not determine the exact form
of compensation.
The analysis is similar for the case in
which disagreement or low effort imply
temporary layoff as opposed to severance.
For example, suppose aw = am = 0.  In this
instance, assumption 1 is replaced by b <
zB < x < zG.  Under the robust solution with
temporary layoffs, we have w = gR; since
equation 6 continues to be necessary for
satisfaction of the incentive constraints, it
follows that the robust solution cannot be
implemented as a consequence of zB < x.
Further, it is easy to verify that the fragile
solution, which involves layoffs in the 
bad state, can be implemented, and the
assumption b < zB implies that the layoffs
are inefﬁcient.
Other Cases
Limited Liability.  Agents may be protected
from liability for payments in the event
that the relationship is severed.  This
serves as a further restriction on the case
of limited veriﬁability, where sA = sB = 0 is
now imposed.  It is easy to see that there is
a solution to expressions 6-8 satisfying this
restriction:  sG
C is pinned down by inequali-
ties 7 and 8, and sG
0 is then chosen to
satisfy equation 6.  Interestingly, a contract
of this form may involve bond-posting by
the worker.  For example, a high positive
value of sG
C may be speciﬁed in order to
sustain the worker’s incentives to choose
high effort, combined with a negative
value of sG
0 that implements the bargaining
solution.  Here the worker makes an 
up-front transfer, sG
0, and receives recompense
sG
C only in the event that high effort is real-
ized.  To the extent that sG
C, is ﬁxed by
inequalities 7 and 8, higher values of pm
correspond to larger bonding measures.
Noncontractible Worker Effort. The
actions of some agents may be unobservable
to the enforcement authority, even as trans-
fers can be conditioned on the behavior of
other agents. Consider the case in which
the worker’s effort is noncontractible in
this sense.  Thus, the authority cannot disin-
guish between outcomes B and C, although
A is still separately observable.10 In contrast
to the case of limited veriﬁability, it is pos-
sible to implement the robust solution in
this environment.  First, the manager’s
incentive constraint (inequality 3) can be
satisﬁed by choosing sufﬁciently large sA.
Since sB = sk
C, however, the worker’s
constraint (inequality 4) now becomes 
(9)
Observe that current-period choices of 
sk
0 and sk
C cannot affect whether inequality
9 is satisﬁed.  It follows that the robust
outcome is sustainable if and only if
inequality 9 holds at values of the transfer
payments that solve equation 2, which will
tend to occur when pw is large or when xw
is small.  Thus, through their effect on the
worker’s expected future compensation,
bargaining weights have an impact on
incentives, although they have no implica-
tions for the form of compensation (salary
versus performance pay).
Nonveriﬁability. Finally, consider the 
case in which the enforcement authority
cannot distinguish between any of the 
outcomes A, B, and C.  Thus, there is a
single transfer payment sk that is enforced
under all three outcomes.  Note ﬁrst that
the robust solution cannot be forced in 
this case, as adding inequalities 3 and 4 for
k = B implies violation of the assumption
zB + gR < x+w.  Next, the fragile solution
can be enforced if the following conditions
hold for the value of gwF determined 
by equation 6:
g x w
wR w w ³ + .
10It is implicit in this assumption
that the authority cannot tell
whether severance is the result
of worker low effort in the 
current period or failure to reach
agreement in the following
period; for example, the 
current-period contract does 
not extend to cover separations
that occur as a result of the
worker’s low effort.
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(11)
As in the previous case, the agents’ relative
bargaining weights inﬂuence whether
cooperation can be sustained.  Note that
these conditions are unaltered if it is
instead assumed that the enforcement
authority cannot enforce any transfers at
all, since all needed transfers can be made
using the up-front payment sG
0.
Summary
Observability of actions within the
relationship by external authorities plays a
key role in determining how successful
agents can be in solving their contracting
problems.  Full veriﬁability implies that
the complete range of necessary transfer
payments can be enforced, allowing the
most efﬁcient solution to be implemented.
In contrast, nonveriﬁability rules out
efﬁciency, and even the fragile solution
becomes  unenforceable for a range of para-
meter values.  Between these two extremes,
various possibilities arise.  When veriﬁability
is limited in the sense that severance
payments cannot be conditioned on the
reason  for severance, only the fragile solu-
tion is implementable; when worker effort
is noncontractible, the bargaining outcome
determines the solution, and there will be
no production in any state when the work-
er’s bargaining power is sufﬁciently small.
Finally, except in the case of limited
liability, the split of the worker’s compen-
sation between salary and performance
payments plays no role in implementing
the various solutions.
EFFICIENCY WAGES
Efﬁciency Wages and Contract
Negotiation
The literature on moral hazard in labor
relationships has placed great emphasis on
solving worker incentive problems through
the payment of efﬁciency wages.  Funda-
mental to the idea of an efﬁciency wage is
that motivating the worker to choose high
effort places a binding constraint on wage
setting, so that wages cannot be cut without
inducing low effort.  In other words, when
the ﬁrm and worker negotiate over wages in
a period, they confront a trade-off between
the worker’s compensation and effort incen-
tives. In this section we show, however, 
that such a trade-off never arises in the con-
tracting setting considered thus far.  Thus,
there is no scope for efﬁciency-wage effects
in contracting models of this form.11
Consider the incentive constraints for
the manager and worker, which we can
write generally as
and
Observe that, in addition to the parameters
zk, xm, xw, wm, and ww that are ﬁxed from
the perspective of the manager and worker,
these constraints depend on three sets of
parameters.  First, there is the joint contin-
uation value gj, which is maximized when
the agents select the best equilibrium
(either robust, fragile, or immediate sever-
ance).  Since higher values of gj relax the
incentive constraints, there is no trade-off
between compensation and incentives at
the level of equilibrium selection.  Second,
the constraints involve the manager and
worker’s shares of the continuation value,
described by gj – gwj and gwj.  Given gj,
these values are tied down by negotiation
in future periods, which in turn is fully
determined by bargaining weights and the
fixed disagreement point D.  In other words,
from the agents’ perspective at the negotia-
tion phase in any given period, they have
no control over continuation values in a
way that forces them to address a trade-off
between compensation and incentives.
The third set of parameters comprise
the contracted transfers sA, sB, and sk
C.
These are directly controlled by the worker
and ﬁrm in the current period.  Note, 
however, that the up-front transfer sk
0 does
s g x s w C
k wj w
B
w + ³ + + .
z s g g x s w
k
C
k j wj m
A
m - + - ³ - +
g x w
wF w w ³ + .
z g g x w
G F wF m m + - ³ + ,
11The term “efﬁciency wages” is
also used in connection with
the idea that incentive prob-
lems lead to involuntary unem-
ployment.  Regardless of
incentive problems, however,
employed workers fare better
than unemployed workers
whenever employment relation-
ships entail quasi-rents (as
when matching is costly/fric-
tional) and workers have some
bargaining power.  Further, as
argued by Carmichael (1985),
involuntary unemployment is
not a necessary consequence of
incentive problems.
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a free parameter, sk
0 can be set to affect any
division of the relationship’s value between
the ﬁrm and worker, with no implications
for the provision of incentives in the current
period.12 As a result, during contract negoti-
ation, there is absolutely no trade-off between
compensating the worker and inducing high
effort, and so there is no payment of
efﬁciency wages.13
This is not to say that incentive
constraints are unimportant.  Our point is
that consideration of incentives in employ-
ment relationships should center on the
satisfaction of incentive constraints given
the contracting and matching environment,
which may or may not generate phenomena
such as efﬁciency wages.  Importantly, the
contracting environment is described by
bargaining powers, whether negotiation is
recurrent, and the extent of veriﬁability.
Worker Liquidity Constraints
Efﬁciency-wage effects emerge if the
worker is unable to make payments to the
manager, because of insufﬁcient worker liq-
uidity.  A worker liquidity constraint can be
introduced into the model by requiring
that all transfer payments be nonnegative.
Consider the implications of this constraint
in the case of full veriﬁability.  Since sB > _ 0,
supporting the robust solution requires
that inequality 4 be replaced by
(12)
where gwR is determined by equation 2.
Inequality 12 is made as slack as possible
by setting the salaries sk
0 equal to zero 
and compensating the worker completely
through performance payments.  If
inequality 12 still does not hold, then sk
C
must be raised above the value determined
by equation 2 in order to induce high effort,
so that inequality 12 becomes binding 
in sk
C.  In this case, a trade-off between
compensation and incentives is clearly 
present, and we can say that an efﬁciency
wage is paid in state k.  
As one possibility, suppose that equa-
tion 2 with sk
0 = 0 implies the following:
Here the agents must agree to a higher
value of sB
C when the bad state is realized,
in order to induce the worker to choose
high effort.  Correspondingly, sG
C will be
chosen at a lower value in order to maintain
equation 2 in the good state.  It may be
that sG
C must be lowered so much that
inequality 12 becomes binding even in 
the good state.  In any event, we have
and it follows that the worker receives an
efﬁciency wage in the bad state.  Observe
that the worker obtains a value strictly in
excess of his outside option even when 
pw = 0; in this case, compensation is equal
in both states, and efﬁciency wages are
paid in both states.  We conclude that 
efﬁciency wages may emerge when worker
liquidity constraints rule out the use of direct
penalties or worker bonding to enforce high
effort.  It should be noted that the manager
must give up some of his bargaining surplus
when efﬁciency wages are needed, which
may lead to disagreement and inefﬁcient
severance despite the existence of full 
veriﬁability. Whenever inequality 12 is
binding, the manager obtains a payoff of 
zk + gR – xw – ww, which can lie below his
outside option value bm + wm even when
agreement is reachable in the absence of
liquidity constraints.  A similar analysis
may be carried out for the other contracting
environments, where prospects for
obtaining productive solutions are also
reduced by the addition of a worker
liquidity constraint.14
Relation to Other Models
In this section, we consider how the
efﬁciency wage issue is treated in a few of
the standard models of dynamic labor con-
tracting found in the literature.  The model
of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) can be viewed
as producing a trade-off between worker
compensation and incentives by constraining
the kinds of contracts that ﬁrms may offer
to workers.  In essence, ﬁrms are required
to offer a single, stationary wage.  Over 
s g z g b w b w C
B wR w B R w w + > + - - ( )+ + p ,
s g x w s g C
B wR w w
C
G wR + < + £ + .
s g x w C
k wR w w + ³ + ,
12Note that only in the case of
nonveriﬁability is the value sk
0
constrained to equal one of the
other contracted transfers.  In
this case, however, the exter-
nally enforced transfers disap-
pear from the incentive
constraints altogether.
13This conclusion remains valid
when effort choices are imper-
fectly monitored; see note 4.
Imperfect monitoring affects
the values of g
j and gwj that
can be achieved and alters the
form of the incentive con-
straints, but it remains the case
that sk
O can be freely varied to
effect any desired division of
surplus.
14See Dickens, et al. (1989) for
an informal discussion of legal
and social constraints to bond-
ing that can motivate payment
of efﬁciency wages.  These
authors also consider the trade-
off between costly monitoring
and performance payments as
mechanisms for eliciting effort.
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committed to the same transfer in each
period, conditional on no discovery of
shirking.  In fact, ﬁrms would prefer to offer
a low wage in the current period, with
only the promise of higher wages later.15
MacLeod and Malcomson’s (1989,
1993, 1998) theory is designed to rectify
such inconsistencies by explicitly modeling
the contracting process.  They provide a
more rigorous foundation for the kinds of
market phenomena of interest to the early
efﬁciency-wage literature, such as involun-
tary unemployment.  By tying prevailing
labor contracts to a social norm, however,
their model does not incorporate trade-offs
between compensation and incentives 
at the level of individual employment rela-
tionships.  Rather, compensation and
incentives are together traded off against
social sanctions.16
In Ramey and Watson (1997a),
ﬁrm/worker pairs determine long-term
contracts through direct bilateral negotiation,
and they are not inﬂuenced by social
norms.  Like the model presented here,
however, there is no tension between com-
pensation and incentives, so efﬁciency
wages are not at issue. Through the use of
an up-front transfer, a ﬁrm and worker can
manage any split of the relationship’s value,
while implementing the best outcome that
veriﬁability will allow.  The present model
takes the contracting framework a step fur-
ther by incorporating the negotiation phase
in each period of interaction, which implies
that ongoing surplus division is moderated
by bargaining weights.17
MARKET OUTCOMES
We now describe how employment
relationships are formed in steady-state
matching equilibria.  Assume that the labor
market contains a unit mass of workers,
each of whom either begins a period
matched with a manager in an employment
relationship or begins the period in a pool
of unmatched workers seeking to locate a
manager.  In addition, there is a large
number of potential managers. At the
beginning of each period, unmatched 
managers can elect to post vacancies at a
cost of c > 0. For simplicity, we assume that
unmatched workers bear no search costs.
The ﬂow of new matches in a period is
given by a standard matching function,
m(U,V), where U indicates the mass of
unmatched workers and V gives the mass 
of managers who post vacancies.18
The matching process is assumed to
take place in phase C at the same time as
production occurs in active relationships.
Thus, workers whose relationships are 
severed in phases D, A, or B can enter the
current-period matching pool.  Further, 
to ensure that the pool of unemployed
workers does not become empty, we assume
that, with probability rx, relationships are
severed for exogenous reasons.  Exogenous
separations occur in phase 1, and workers
who experience these separations can also
enter the current-period matching pool.
We consider two types of steady-state
equilibria of the model, distinguished 
by whether contracting solutions within
relationships are robust or fragile.  For
robust and fragile equilibria, respectively,
the discounted future values of relationships
are determined by
and
where wR and wF give the values of outside
options in robust and fragile equilibria.
The value of the worker’s outside option in
either case satisﬁes
where gwR and gwF are determined by 
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15Resolving this issue requires a
more complete model of con-
tract determination, as
Carmichael’s (1985) critique of
the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984)
model indicates.
16In MacLeod and Malcomson
(1998), if a ﬁrm offers any
contract not in accord with the
norm, it is branded as a
deviant, and workers at this
ﬁrm shirk forever after.  In
MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989), the social coordination
role is modeled more abstractly
in terms of prevailing equilibri-
um beliefs.  Incidentally, since
a matched ﬁrm and worker do
not have direct control over
their joint plan of behavior in
the theory of MacLeod and
Malcomson, total inaction can
be supported as an equilibrium.
17Ramey and Watson (1997a)
also incorporate what one
might call an efﬁciency invest-
ment:  Since the ﬁrm makes a
noncontractible investment that
affects incentives and value, it
faces a direct trade-off between
compensating the worker (by
raising or lowering the value of
the relationship) and satisfying
incentive constraints. 
18Added assumptions are ordinari-
ly imposed to guarantee exis-
tence of equilibrium and to
facilitate theoretical analysis of
steady-states and dynamics.
We do not lay out these
assumptions here, since we
restrict our attention to a single
numerical example.
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pool, the value of managers’ outside option
is zero, and we have the following free-
entry condition:
Finally, the number of employed workers
and the size of the unemployment pool are
given by
and
Observe that the latter two equations 
conform to the assumption that workers
whose relationships are severed enter the
unemployment pool in the current period.  
We model cyclical shocks as changes
in r  holding other parameters ﬁxed.  To
keep the analysis simple, we look at compar-
ative statics of steady states as a function  of
r.  Thus, we approximate the business
cycle by studying the economy’s long-run
response to a highly persistent productivity
shock.  This is a good approximation when
the cycle has a low frequency and/or
response is rapid.  Figure 2 shows results
for four contracting environments under a
particular parameterization of the model.
Equilibrium employment and average
wages under the four cases are traced out
as r  rises from zero, at the upper right-
hand corner of all four curves, to 0.04.
For comparison, the values at r  = 0.02 are
indicated by dots.19
Consider ﬁrst the case of full veriﬁability,
in which workers and managers are able to
write robust contracts.  The right-most
curve in Figure 2 depicts employment and
average wages for this case.  A productivity
shock taking the form of an increase in r
shifts the outcome down the curve, so that
employment and wages both fall.  Since
relationships are robust, the rise in r  has
no effect on the breakup probability.
Employment is lower only because managers
are less willing to post vacancies, given
that average productivity is lower.  The
reduction in wages also reﬂects lower
average productivity, as well as a reduced
value of the worker’s matching probability.  
Next, the case of full veriﬁability with
worker liquidity constraints, as discussed
in the previous section, is considered 
for two values of the worker matching
probability.  For pw = 1/2, equilibria are
robust, and the worker liquidity constraint
binds in the bad productivity state; thus,
efﬁciency wages are paid only in the bad
state.  In this case, wages adjust a little less
relative to employment, when compared to
the full veriﬁability case, but the effect is
slight.  Setting pw=0 yields robust equilibria
with efﬁciency wages paid in both states,
and relative wage adjustment declines  a bit
more.20 In these cases, worker liquidity
constraints restrict the decline in wages as
r  rises, and the dampening effect on wage
adjustment is more pronounced as the liq-
uidity constraint binds in a larger number
of states.  
Finally, the case of limited veriﬁability,
described in the external enforcement and
veriﬁability  section, is shown as the left-most
curve.  Equilibria are fragile in this case; in
particular, inequality 1 holds at the value
w = wF.  As r  rises, employment reductions
become much sharper due to the increase
in the probability of severance.  Average
productivity is also reduced relative to the
UN
x =-- ()- () [] 111 rr.
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19Parameter values are zG = 1,
zB = 0.5, xw = 1.25, xm = 1.45,
b
w = b
m = 0.2, b  = 0.96,
m(U, V) = 0.25U 
0.5V 
0.5, 
c = 0.157, and r x= 0.07  .
We also have pw = 0.5 except
for one case where we set pw = 0.
20We have renormalized the 
pw = 0  economy to equate
employment and wages at 
r  = 0 under the various cases.
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Employmentearlier cases, since output in bad states is
zero, rather than zB.  The latter effect also
tends to reduce employment, by depressing
vacancies, and it causes wage reductions to
be much greater.  Thus, the higher breakup
probabilities lead shocks to be signiﬁcantly
magniﬁed when contracts are restricted by
limited veriﬁability.  Observe further that
relative wage adjustment is substantially
less when compared to the other cases, as
the higher probability of breakups serves
to shift the cross-sectional distribution of
wages toward relatively high productivity
relationships.
Overall, this example demonstrates
that efﬁciency-wage effects can dampen
wage adjustments, as past authors have
suggested, but that the scope for efﬁciency
wages as a mechanism for propagating
shocks is limited. Fragility effects deriving
from limited veriﬁability, on the other
hand, can produce large magniﬁcation of
shocks; further, changes in the composition
of jobs generates more dampening in the
adjustment of wages.21
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the preceding results,
we offer three broad conclusions.  First,
the particular form of imperfections that
are present in the contracting environment
can have major implications for economic
outcomes.  In moving from limited liquidity
to limited veriﬁability, for example, the
implications for important variables such
as employment, wages and job displacement
probabilities can be radically altered.
“Reduced-form” analysis of contracting
imperfections that have been prevalent in
much past macroeconomic literature may
hide too much of the key underlying struc-
ture.  Contractual outcomes depend on the
way ﬁrms and workers meet and negotiate,
and this demands a new theoretical perspec-
tive and reformulation of conventional
notions, such as the idea of efﬁciency wages.
Second, economic effects deriving
from severance of employment relationships
warrant very close attention as explanations
for observed phenomena, including the
occurrence of large cyclical ﬂuctuations in
employment and the relatively dampened
character of wage adjustments.  Broad
cyclical swings in job destruction rates
have been documented by Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), who 
also highlight the large number of macro-
economic questions that may be linked to
job creation and destruction.  From the
quantitative standpoint, den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (1997) show how ﬂuctuations
in job destruction rates can serve as an
important mechanism for propagation 
of business cycle shocks.  The heavy focus
of much past work on wage-setting within
a given set of employment contracts may
be misplaced.
Third, interactions between credit
market imperfections and imperfections 
in labor contracting can yield interesting
new implications.  In this paper, we have
linked the occurrence of efﬁciency wages
with worker liquidity constraints.  More
broadly, the ability to solve contracting
problems is closely tied to credit-market
trading, and these ties may prove to be of
central importance in accounting for
macroeconomic phenomena.
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